Can the 16 th and early 17 th centuries in Poland-Lithuania and some other east-central European countries be characterized as a "Golden Age" in human capital? We trace the development of a specific human capital indicator during this period: numeracy. We draw upon new evidence for Poland and Russia from the early 17 th century onwards; and for Belarus, Ukraine, and Lithuania from the 18 th century onwards; controlling for potential selectivity issues. Poland had quite high levels of numeracy during the early 17 th century, but these levels subsequently fell below those of even southern Europe. As in other countries in the area, numeracy levels in Poland were lower than those of western Europe during the 17 th , 18 th , and early 19 th centuries. This finding might support the hypothesis that the second serfdom process, which gained momentum during the 17 th century, was one of the core reasons why human capital accumulation was delayed in eastern Europe. The major wars in the region also had devastating effects on numeracy levels.
Introduction
A number of scholars have argued that eastern central Europe was once a region with a high standard of living, even in comparison to western Europe. Van Zanden (1999) Using a broader cost-of-living basket, Allen (2001) showed that during the 16 th century, English and Polish cities had similar real wage levels (based on maxima in 1599), and that the English cities did not pull ahead of the Polish cities in terms of wage levels until the 17 th century. A recent study by Malinowski (2013) found that, relative to their counterparts in England, urban workers in Poland even had a substantial real wage advantage (based on barebones baskets), but that when the real wages of rural workers were also taken into account, Poland was roughly on par with England during the late 16 th century, and had lower wage levels before and after. 2 Anthropometric indices are useful complements to these results because they also include the relatively large groups of farmers and other self-employed individuals; although the sample sizes are relatively small for the early modern period. Baten (2005, 2008) found that northern and eastern European health and nutrition levels 1 Of course, the cities for which evidence is available may not be representative for all of eastern Europe. In fact, in our conclusion we will argue that western and central Poland, to which they refer, still had a remarkably high level of numeracy in the early 17 th century, unlike in other regions.
were more favorable than those of western and southern Europe. According to estimates in Koepke and Baten (2005, In an attempt to answer these and related questions, we will study the development of numeracy in this region. Numeracy is clearly a core component of human capital, especially in agricultural societies, as individuals who were making decisions about the timing of activities had to take a number of issues into account, such as the weather, the status of plants and animals, and other similar variables. We will therefore use techniques for measuring age-heaping to compare numeracy in several eastern and central-eastern
European regions with evidence from western and southern Europe. Although Poland belongs to central-eastern Europe, we will use the term eastern Europe in the following for reasons of brevity.
Our sources include various kinds of census and census-like microdata from the territories of historical Poland-Lithuania, the Russian Empire, as well as regional data for 1880 in Prussia and Austria-Hungary. In each case, the listings contained descriptions of the characteristics of each of the individuals who were grouped into a given household, 3 During the 17th century, however, the heights of eastern Europeans started to decline sharply.
including the individual's age, sex, marital status, and his or her relationship to the household head (see more in Data section).
These sources allowed us to estimate numeracy in several regions of what is today
Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Russia. The application of age-heaping-based numeracy estimates to this newly available dataset is performed here for the first time for such a large region and for the time frame (but see Mironov 1991 and Kaiser and Peyton 1993 on Russian samples). We carefully discuss the potential selectivity biases of these sources. While social selectivity is not a major problem due to the non-exclusive "censustype" character of these sources, regional selectivity is a large challenge that requires special treatment in this study. Given the regional character of our sources, we compare the places we can cover with representative nationwide census evidence of the early 19 th century.
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The remainder of the study is organized as follows. We first review some findings and hypotheses of the previous literature regarding the reasons why eastern Europe lagged behind western Europe in educational and welfare levels. In the second section, we present our new dataset and explain its capabilities and limitations. In Section 3, we briefly explain our age-heaping methodology, and address some concerns scholars may have about it. We also offer some responses to potential criticism of age-heaping proponents. In Section 4, we discuss potential selectivities of this new evidence, report the results at the regional level, and present a method that can be used to adjust for 4 We decided to aggregate the numeracy estimates using today's national borders rather than historical empires or other regional units. This will allow for the comparison of the estimates with other historical evidence in the future (such as GDP estimates, anthropometric welfare, and other indicators).
regional selectivities. Finally, in Section 5, we present national estimates since the 17 th century for the five eastern European countries in our sample, and compare these estimates with evidence from western and southern Europe. Finally, we present a tentative discussion of the implications of our findings for our understanding of economic growth in early modern Europe.
Review of the literature
In his study of literacy rates around 1800, Reis (2005) By contrast, the literacy rates in western Europe were estimated at between 15 and 65 percent in the early modern period until around 1800 (A'Hearn et al. 2009, p. 802 ).
Mironov also looked at local samples of Baltic peasants and other sources to assess the degree of age-heaping, but did not organize the data by birth cohorts of adults. Kaiser and Peyton (1993) (Sklar 1970 , Plakans and Wetherell 2005 , Szołtysek 2007 , 2012a , 2014 ). Yet despite these challenges, the Hajnal hypothesis remains a persistent stereotype in economic history, as well as in the demographic literature. The nature of this discussion may be influenced by the traditional dividing line between economists, who tend to accept simplifications and the statistical concept of the average; and family historians, who tend to adopt more nuanced and contextualized perspectives that stress micro-and meso-level variation (see Szołtysek 2012b ).
But it is also possible that the east-west divide was caused by other factors mentioned below. We should note upfront that the Hajnal hypothesis is considered here with very strong reservations. Educational gender inequalities might have led to the people of eastern Europe having less education on average, as the women were mainly responsible for basic education in the household.
c) The second serfdom hypothesis is also commonly cited in the economic history literature (Kula, 1976; Millward 1982; Cerman 2008; Ogilvie and Edwards 2000; also Sosnowska 2004) . Scholars have noted that historical Poland and Russia in particular were affected by noble landlordism and village subjection (Hagen, 1998; also Mironov, 1996) .
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The dramatic expansion of the powers landlords had over the rural population in these areas was closely related to a rapid rise in agricultural commodity values in the west caused by the 16th-century "price revolution." The eastern European landowners responded to this trend by expanding their previously modest familial manor farms into 5 These were: juridical subjection, migration regulations, legal attachment to a particular social status, subjection to communal payments and duties (including the harshest forms of compulsory labor), limited right to private property, limited choice of occupation, and unprotected personal dignity; see Mironov, 1996, p. 323. large-scale domanial economies designed to produce surpluses for sale on the urban markets of western Europe. This type of seigneurialism prompted landlords to demand from their peasant subjects not only rents in cash and kind, but above all labor services, which were essential to the very functioning of the demesne farms (Szołtysek 2008a) .
Serfs therefore had relatively few incentives or opportunities to invest in the kind of basic education which would have enabled them to understand the numeracy concept applied in this study.
There were of course very different forms of serfdom (Cerman 2012 . For example, in large areas of the historical Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a softened version of the system-based on cash quitrents rather than on corvée, or a mixture of the two-emerged in the second half of the 17 th century, and prevailed until the end of the Polish republic in 1795 (Szołtysek 2008 , earlier Kozlovskij 1961 .
As a minor digression from the literature review, we will look briefly at the regional distribution of serfs, as opposed to free or manumitted persons, and of the people who lived on government-owned estates.
An overwhelming majority of the population of all of the territories under investigation lived in personal and hereditary subjection up until the 19th-century reforms, with their property rights limited to an indeterminate leasehold. For this period, however, the share of hereditary or emphyteutic freeholders (i.e., peasants who held more advantageous property rights) appears to decline substantially and continuously when moving eastward across the Polish territories towards Russia (Rutkowski, 1986; Moon 1999 ). Moreover, if we look at the distribution of the share of serfs in the Russian Empire during the mid-19 th century, a clear regional pattern emerges ( Figure 3 ).
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Especially in a central corridor between Belarus (Minsk) and Nishniy Novgorod, the share of serfs was particularly large. By contrast, there were relatively few serfs in the thinly populated regions of both the northeast and the southeast. During the late serfdom period, the southeast in particular had a slightly less oppressive system of Obrok (defined as feudal obligations that were paid in money or kind), whereas the corvée system of compulsory labor was more typical in other regions. The share of serfs actually corresponds quite well with the regional distribution of numeracy and literacy. In Figures 1 and 2 , the ABCC index of numeracy is compared with the numeracy rate. The former is defined as the share of persons who probably know their age with an annual resolution. 8 7 Note, however, that no data are provided for Polish territories.
8 The ABCC Index used in these figures reports the share of individuals in a given society who probably know their true age (named after A'Hearn, Baten and Crayen as well as Greg Clark, who developed that measure). The formula is
The index ranges from zero to 100. If everybody reports their correct age, ABCC has a value of 100. d) Large-farm agriculture is often associated with a political economy in which large landowners prevented tax-financed public schooling, as they saw no need for serfs to be educated (and perhaps learn how to demand political rights) in schools financed by the taxes of the rich. Even after the abolition of serfdom, many agricultural laborers had no access to schooling. 9 e) Similarly, the political leaders of the Russian Empire did not favor education, and the Polish population in Prussia received insufficient schooling in their native language (Baten, 2003) . In Austria-Hungary, investments in education were also insufficient (Cvrcek, 2013) . The Russian Empire was dominated by the nobility, who were landed property owners. Thus, investment in schooling was not very high on the national agenda in Russia until the Empire lost the Crimean War. This major defeat shined a spotlight not just on the military inferiority of Russia, but also on the Empire's backwardness in terms of productivity and human capital. Thereafter, the government implemented reforms which included investments in larger-scale schooling and literacy promotion (Mironov, 2012, p. 297 ).
f) The frequent wars, including civil wars, waged in eastern Europe might have fostered an attitude of risk aversion among the population regarding investments of any sort. The terrible damage of the mid-17 th -century wars, followed by yet more carnage in the 1720s, led to the development of the manorial economy, and to land-labor ratios that 9 "Agricultural laborers" were only part of the socioeconomic landscape of eastern Europe for the period after the formal abolition of serfdom; they emerged quite early in Galicia due to the Josephinian reforms of 1780s, and then in the province of Greater Poland (Prussian Province of Posen) after the 1820s.
were not very different from those of the late 17th century; i.e., at the beginning of the agrarian change (Szołtysek 2008a (Mitterauer 2003) .
Some of these potential determinants will be discussed below using interregional comparisons, while others will be discussed using east-west comparisons. However, the aim of the present paper is not to perform a regression in which these potential explanations are systematically tested against each other.
Sources
Our sources are: (1) 
Assessing human capital formation with the age-heaping indicator and other measures of human capital
Measuring the production factor "human capital" has never been simple, as advanced forms of skills are difficult to compare. All economists have therefore resorted to using proxy indicators, such as the share of people signing a marriage register. Grundlach of different proxy indicators might be the best option for obtaining reliable insights. This is the rationale for using the age-heaping methodology (as well as comparisons of literacy and schooling, wherever they are available to us). We will explain the advantages and caveats in somewhat greater detail, as the application of this method in economic history is still relatively new.
This approach employs the set of methods that developed around the phenomenon of "age-heaping;" i.e., the tendency of poorly educated people to round their age erroneously. For example, less educated people are more likely than people with a greater endowment of human capital to state their age as "30," even if they are in fact 29 or 31 years old (Mokyr 1985).
11 Crayen and Baten (2008) found that the relationship between illiteracy and age-heaping for LDCs after 1950 is very close. They calculated age-11 Among demographers, this specific type of age misreporting constitutes "one of most frustrating problems" (Ewbank 1981, 88) . It is treated as a source of distortion in age-specific vital rates which needs to be removed, or at least minimized in order to study the family or household variables.
heaping and illiteracy rates for not less than 270,000 individuals who were organized by 416 regions, ranging from Latin America to Oceania. Their findings indicated that the correlation coefficient with illiteracy was as high as 0.7, and that the correlation with the PISA results for numerical skills was as high as 0.85. They therefore concluded that the age-heaping measure "Whipple Index" is more strongly correlated with numerical skills.
A'Hearn, Baten, and Crayen (2009) used a large U.S. census sample to perform a very detailed analysis of this relationship. They subdivided the sample by race, gender, high and low educational status, and other criteria. In each case, they obtained a statistically significant relationship. It is also remarkable that the coefficients were found to be relatively stable between samples; i.e., a unit change in age-heaping was associated with similar changes in literacy across the various tests. These results are not only valid for the U.S.: in all of the countries studied so far that had substantial age-heaping, the correlation was found to be both statistically and economically significant. centuries. It is likely that the unavoidable measurement error when using early modern data induced the lower statistical significance.
13
To the best of our knowledge, the widest geographical sample studied so far was created by . This sample included 70 countries for which both age-heaping and schooling data (as well as other explanatory variables) were available.
They found in a series of cross-sections between the 1880s and 1940s that primary schooling and age-heaping were closely correlated, with R-squares between 0.55 and 0.76 (including other control variables, see below). Again, the coefficients were shown to be relatively stable over time. This large sample also allowed them to examine various other potential determinants of age-heaping. To assess whether factors such as the degree of bureaucracy, birth registration practices, and government interaction with citizens influenced the likelihood that an individual would know his or her exact age, independent of personal education, Crayen and Baten used the number of censuses performed for each individual country up to the period under study as an explanatory variable for their ageheaping measure. Except for countries with a very long history of census-taking, all of the variations of this variable turned out to be insignificant, which would suggest that an independent bureaucracy effect was rather weak. In other words, it appears that societies in which a large number of censuses were conducted and birth registers were introduced early had a high degree of age awareness. But those societies also introduced schooling 13 Historical demographers often find that data from premodern times are very rough, imprecise, or fragmentary. Even the 18 th -century statistical materials are a veritable jungle of uncertainties and traps, as they were sometimes collected haphazardly and analyzed without care; as a result, they often capture only a portion of the phenomenon they are seeking to describe, and are thus incomplete (Szołtysek 2011 (Szołtysek , 2014 ).
The quality of the data on age may be particularly poor.
early, and this was the variable that clearly had more explanatory power than the independent bureaucracy effect. Crayen and Baten also tested whether the general standard of living had an influence on age-heaping tendencies (using height as well as GDP per capita as welfare indicators), and found a varying influence: in some decades, there was a statistically significant correlation, while in others there was none.
Was this correlation between numeracy and literacy also visible in eastern 14 Interestingly, the northeastern districts of European Russia-such as Archangelsk, Wologda, and Perm-had much higher numeracy than literacy levels. The previous literature has noted that the existence of schools is even more important for the development of literacy than for the development of basic numeracy, as families are more likely to teach children the fundamentals of numeracy than of literacy. In the thinly populated regions of the northeast, attending school was much more difficult than it was in the more densely populated areas farther south.
In conclusion, the correlation between age-heaping and other human capital indicators is quite well established, and the "bureaucratic" factor does not invalidate this 14 Please note that, as serfdom was abolished in all these territories in 1864, these effects must have arisen in the first four decades. The district of Kowno was an outlier.
relationship. A caveat relates to other forms of heaping (apart from the heaping on multiples of five), such as heaping on multiples of two, which was quite widespread among children and teenagers, and to a lesser extent among young adults in their twenties.
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This shows that most individuals knew their age as teenagers, but that only those in well-educated societies were able to remember or calculate their exact age later in life. At higher ages, this heaping pattern was mostly negligible, but it was, interestingly, somewhat stronger among populations who were numerate enough not to round on multiples of five. We will exclude those below age 23 and above 72, since a number of distortions could affect those specific age groups, leading to age reporting behavior that may have differed from that of the adult group in between. Many young males and females married in their early twenties or late teens, when they also had to register as voters, military conscripts, etc. On such occasions, they were sometimes subject to minimum age requirements, a condition which gave rise to increased age awareness. Moreover, individuals in this age group were physically growing, which made it easier to determine their age with a relatively high degree of accuracy. All of these factors contributed to a reduction in age-heaping among children and young adults relative to levels observed among older adults. Because the age-heaping patterns of very old individuals were subject to upward as well as downward bias for the reasons mentioned above, the very old should also be excluded. 15 It has been shown that, in some societies, in addition to the usual overrepresentation of five and zero, there was also a decided preference for figures ending on other digits, and that the avoidance of certain numbers was likely to occur in a patterned way as well (Stockwell 1966; Nagi, Stockwell and Snavley 1973; also Myers 1940) .
Some uncertainty remains as to whether the age-heaping found in the sources reflects the numeracy of the responding individual, or rather the diligence of the reporting personnel who wrote down the statements (e.g., Szołtysek 2011 Szołtysek , 2014 example, that a wife may appear to have been more numerate than she actually was because she improved her age statement with the help of her husband. They compared the numeracy of married and unmarried women, and found that the latter had significantly lower numeracy in some of their samples. However, de Moor and Zuijderduijn (2013) recently challenged these findings with a number of good arguments. and literacy also applies to gender differences. For our study, the question of whether the women answered themselves is slightly less important, because we only seek to estimate average numeracy.
Moreover, there is sometimes direct evidence in the sources that the wives themselves were asked. Manzel et al. (2011) reported finding sources on Latin American
Indio women in which statements like this one were included: "She says that she is 30, but she looks more like 40." Even for black female (and male) slaves in the Cape Colony in South Africa who were accused of crimes, the legal personnel created a separate column that indicated whether the person was guessing her age, or whether she actually knew it. We can speculate that if these Indio and African women-who probably were not shown much respect by colonial officers-were asked to report their age, then
European women-who were likely treated with a greater level of respect-might have also have been asked to report their age.
The problem of different enumerators influencing the quality of age statements has also been studied in a 20 Of course, a potential bias always exists if more than one person is involved in the creation of a historical source. For example, if literacy is measured by analyzing the share of signatures in marriage contracts, there might have been priests who were more or less interested in obtaining real signatures, as opposed to just crosses or other symbols. We are reassured in our assumptions by the findings of previous studies, which generally indicate that age-heaping was much more prevalent (and numeracy levels were lower) among members of the lower social strata, and among the half of the sample population who had lower anthropometric values (Baten and Mumme 2010) . Moreover, studies have
shown that the regional differences in the prevalence of age-heaping were similar to the regional differences in illiteracy. We can therefore conclude that the method of ageheaping is a useful and innovative tool for assessing human capital.
Potential selectivity issues and the adjustment of regional biases
Whenever a new dataset is used that does not reflect the whole population of a given country or region, the logical next question is about potential selectivity: Is the sample a selective subset of the population we are interested in, or does it more or less cover this population in a representative way? Clearly, perfect representativeness is probably impossible for historical samples of the 17 th or 18 th centuries, but we should at least consider whether the dataset has systematic biases that distort potential results in a significant way, and we should seek to minimize potential measurement error.
Social bias or labor market bias is not a large issue in our sample, given the census-type character of our sample: in principle, everybody in a given city or village should have been included in the dataset, and it is likely that only a few emigrants were absent at the time of the census. However, regional composition is a major issue because we do not have surviving sources for all cities and villages. How can we deal with this potential regional bias in our sample?
We present the ABCC estimates for the individual regions in Table A .1 in the appendix. On the left side of Table A Hence, we need a regional adjustment. For simplicity, we take the difference for the birth cohort of the 1820s and report the regionally adjusted values in Table A .2 in the appendix. This adjustment is based on the assumption that the interregional bias was similar in the early period and for the birth decade of the 1820s. This might not have been the case for all of the regions, but in general the estimate will be closer to the true national average after the adjustment than before. The fact that we normally have four to five different regional datasets to compare allows us to gain an impression of the size of the measurement error implied by this procedure. For example, in the case of Przemyshlany and the birth decade of the 1730s, the resulting value is clearly too low; moreover, the Warsaw region might have been underestimated for the 18 th century. But in the vast majority of cases, the regional adjustment procedure works relatively well. In order to remain consistent, we take all of the values into account.
Estimates for the five eastern European countries and international comparison
In a next step, we generate national estimates based on those regional values. In Figure 4 , we display the regional and national estimates for Russia. Some of the early estimates are above and others are below the estimate for Russia, but the emerging trend seems to be relatively clear. Hence, we show the national trends for all five countries in Figure 5 . We distinguish between the western and the eastern parts of today's Poland. The western part is made up of Silesia (part of Sudetenland, as well as Upper Silesia), which included
German-speaking areas; other parts of Prussia; and districts that were annexed by Prussia and Austria-Hungary in the 18 th -century partitions of Poland. The eastern part consists of the regions that were occupied by the Russian Empire. We were curious about whether the west and the east would yield similar estimates for the whole of Poland after being regionally adjusted to the national mean. In fact, the similarity of the levels found suggests that this division does not affect the estimates for Poland significantly, even if the variation over time is not identical.
Finally, our aim was to make those series graphically comparable with estimates for other European regions. This was achieved by using the LOWESS procedure, which was previously used by Manzel et al. (2011) . In order to make the comparison, the eastern and western parts of Poland were considered together ( Figure 6 ).
Eastern Europe in international comparison
What broad trends could be identified using this procedure, and how do they compare with those of other European regions? In Figure 7 , data from eastern Europe were plotted against the evidence from western and southern European countries, which we derived from Stolz et al. 2012 (see also Tollnek and Finally, the observed differences in numeracy patterns between western and eastern Poland-Lithuania may be indicative of broader developmental disparities between the two parts of the country. Our findings regarding the differences in numeracy patterns correspond well with broader demographic differences between Poland proper on the one hand, and Belarusian and Ukrainian lands on the other, in terms of age at marriage, home-leaving behavior, and household formation and structure (Szołtysek 2014) . Thus, the next step in the analysis might be to place Polish-Lithuanian and Russian numeracy patterns in a wider eastern European comparative perspective. Lowess smoother
